Planning Successful Red Team Operations

HOLY LULZ!

By: Joe Christian

I just walked into the room... Who is this guy?

- Joe Christian
 - Security Risk Assessment team lead at Zappos.com, a subsidiary of Amazon based in Las Vegas, NV.
 - Enjoys all areas of security, but primarily focused on AppSec and Offensive Security.
 - Earliest memories of "security" date back to age 12.
 - Graduated from Nazareth College with a B.S. in Information Technology and Utica College with an M.S. Cybersecurity specializing in Cyber Operations.
 - Published research on bug bounty programs and vulnerability disclosure.
 - Co-Founded DEF CON AppSec Village.
 - Expressed interest in doing a Ph.D. in 2020. More student debt, why not?
 - Working on starting my own company called {REDACTED_NAME_HERE}.
 - Goal: Hit all the national parks in the US before the world chars to oblivion in 2030.

Agenda

- Penetration testing versus red team operations
- Pre-planning work
- Common pitfalls of planning a covert operation
- Avoiding pitfalls
- Staying on plan
- Automation
- Conclusion
- Q&A



Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of the people, institutions or organizations that I may or may not be related with unless stated explicitly.

Operation: Ice Breaker

Raise your hand up if...

- You identify as a yellow team: development, architects, etc.
- You identify as a orange team: TPM's, security awareness, etc.
- You identify as a red team: penetration tester or offensive security role.
- You identify as a blue team: SOC, IR, TI, • engineering, etc.
- You identify as a purple team: blue + red. •
- You identify as a green team: automation, etc.
- You identify as white team: leadership, compliance, risk, etc.
- You identify as academia: professors, students, • researchers, etc.
- None of the above: stand and state your role. •



So who can tell me what a red team operation is?

Penetration testing versus red team operations

Hint: They are not the same thing!


Penetration Testing

- A test to find as many vulnerabilities and configuration issues as possible in the time allotted, and exploiting those vulnerabilities to determine the risk of the vulnerability.
- Duration: Lasts between days to two weeks.
- Scope: Testing restrictions are placed.
- Tooling: Use of common industry tools.
- Overall: Butcher Knife

Red Teaming

- An adversarial test to determine the organization's detection and response capabilities against sophisticated attacks.
- Duration: Lasts between several weeks to months.
- Scope: Unlimited.
- Tooling: Everything including zero-day capabilities.
- Overall: Scalpel

Important, but miscellaneous information



Pre-planning work

Checklist prior to conducting a red team operation

- Education of C-level staff on why these tests need to be conducted.
- Authorization from C-level staff/legal to conduct an operation.
- Determine the approximate cost of running an operation and secure funding.
- Creation of key documents such as a code of conduct or an ethics agreement.
- Establish expectations from stakeholders.






Where is the planning phase?



Sample Red Team Operation Lifecycle

Why is planning important?

- Planning is the SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT! PERIOD.
- This is because life never works out as intended.
- The majority of planning should be conducted prior to the reconnaissance phase.
- However, planning occurs before every single phase.
- The best offensive based operations are planned out with excruciating detail, so don't think you can just "show up".



Roll Safe Think About It Meme

Common pitfalls of planning covert operations

#1 - Bad Operational Security

- Operational Security or (OPSEC) is a systematic process by which potential adversaries can be denied information about the capabilities and intentions of organizations by identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified information that specifically relates to the planning and execution of sensitive organizational activities. (NIST SP.800-53r4)
- In most red team engagements, the organizations blue team will act as the adversary that the red team is attempting to deny information to.
- "Lose Lips Sink Ships".
- DO NOT VOLUNTEER INFORMATION:
 - Don't detail the operation on your viewable Outlook Calendar.
 - Don't inform those who don't have the need to know.
 - Secure physical plans and protect digital plans!

#2- Not Having Clear Objectives

- Objectives = Goals!
- Well defined objectives can be difficult to articulate.
- When we don't have clear objectives, we deviate from our plan. (That's bad!)
- Ask yourself these questions:
 - What are we testing?
 - What are we trying to accomplish?
 - What is valuable to the organization?
 - What adversary are we trying to simulate to the blue team?



Distracted Boyfriend Meme

#3 Picking The Wrong Adversary

- Adversary selection is extremely important.
- Selection should be based on the following criteria:
 - Threat Intelligence from your organization.
 - What does the blue team see?
 - Types of software, OS, or infrastructure you use.
 - Industry your organization operates in.
 - Healthcare, Financial, E-Commerce
 - Potential data you may have.
 - Source code, PII, PHI, etc.
 - Potential access you may provide to others.



Two Button Meme

#4 The Unknown

- Not everything can be under your control.
- Something always goes wrong.
 - When has anyone executed a straight forward red team engagement with zero issues?
- Conservatively, we can maybe plan for 80%.
- It's a lot of work getting to that 80%!
 - Don't get lazy. Put in the time needed to succeed.
 - Make a checklist of "unknown problems" that could jeopardize the operation.
 - Have someone review your list checklist to help close the potential gap.

Avoiding pitfalls

#1 - Avoiding Bad Operational Security

- We need to account for as much information leakage possible.
- Here's a starter list:
 - Classify budgets/PO's as extremely sensitive information, until after engagement!
 - If blue team sees a PO for several AWS instances for the red team...I wonder where the attack is coming from.
 - Licensing, DNS, HTTPS Certificates, Emails, Phone Numbers, and more:
 - If blue team discovers a "malicious" web server and the DNS contains the red teams information on it... OPSEC is ruined.
 - Communication Channels:
 - Traffic needs to be encrypted! Lots of people still run unencrypted internal chat services? Why!?
 - Blue team should not have access to information.
 - Risk analysis on 4th party collection when using 3rd party services.

#1 - Avoiding Bad Operational Security - Continued

- List continued from previous slide:
 - Physical Security:
 - Lock up any printed files and only keep them on out when needed.
 - Erase conference rooms where you might have used a whiteboard.
 - If blue/red team work in a confined space, don't just disappear as this will tip off the opposing team.
 - Computer screen protectors when working with digital items.
 - Digital Security:
 - Did I mention encryption? I'll say encryption again.
 - Access control to ensure only authorized personnel have access.
 - Be careful of things like JIRA, Confluence, File Shares, etc.
 - Use multifactor authentication where ever possible.

#2- Ensuring Clear Objectives

- US Airforce has some great public war doctrine available to model after.
- It can be used to create defined goals across all levels.
 - Strategic (Enterprise wide)
 - Transparency, education, ethics.
 - Operational (Each unique operation)
 - Actor selection and criteria for what will be deemed a successful operation.
 - Tactical (Each phase within an operation)
 - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. (TTPs)



#3 - Attempting to Avoid the Unknown

- Make your checklist for "unknown" items as discussed.
- Test tools and exploits on sample systems before hitting production.
 - This way you can anticipate how the system is going to react and have a plan incase it doesn't go well!
- Anticipate someone or something ruining the plan.
 - Have a secondary and/or tertiary plan ready to go.
- "Deal with it" because it can't be avoided.



"Doge Deal With It" Meme

Staying on plan

Staying On Plan

- Use MITRE ATT&CK Framework.
 - All adversaries are listed along with their TTP's mapped!
 - An amazing matrix that can:
 - Be used to map out an organization's susceptibility and progress over time.
 - Color code TTP's for the adversary of your choice, which makes easy to use operation plans.
 - A collaborative toolset for both blue and red to work off of.
 - I use this daily! Go bookmark:
 - <u>https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/enterprise/</u>

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Sample MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

APT3 +	APT29		st	i ters ages: act atforms: windo	ws, linux, ma	c	(7)	score gradient					
nitial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command And Contro			
0 items	33 items	58 items	28 items	63 items	19 items	20 items	17 items	13 items	9 items	21 items			
rive-by Compromise	AppleScript	bash profile and bashro	Access Token Manipulatio	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfitration	Commonly Used Port			
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	Regaves/Regasm	External Remote Services	Plist Modification	Exploitation for Defense Evosion	Private Keys	System Network Connections Discovery	Windows Ramota Management			Standard Application Layer Protocol			
	Regsvr32	File System Permissions Weakhess	Port Monitors	Extra Window Memory Injection	Securityd Memory	System Owner/User Discovery	Survey and a survey of the			Standard Cryptographic Protocol			
	Rundli22	Hidden Files and Directories	Process Injection	File Deletion	Two-Factor Authentication	System Service Discovery				Laver Protocol			
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	User Execution	Logon Scripts	1	Indicator Removal on Host									
	Windows Managamane	LSASS Driver	1	Indirect Command Execution									
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	XSL Script Processing	Netsh Helper DLL	14	InstalUti	1								
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		Office Apolication Startup		LC MAIN HEacking	1								
		Path Interception	1	Masquerading	1	Sample MIT	REALIX()	Plan					

Automation

Automation

- Use MITRE's API to directly interact with ATT&CK.
- MITRE also open sources their adversary data as raw JSON.
 - Download the raw data and import into other frameworks as needed.
 - <u>https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre/cti/master/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack.json</u>
- Using Red Canary's Atomic Red Team for testing and mapping to ATT&CK.
 - <u>https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team</u>
- Using Scythe to quickly to automate and map back to ATT&CK.
 - <u>https://www.scythe.io/platform</u>
- Using Unfetter to build out an operations planner.
 - <u>https://nsacyber.github.io/unfetter/</u>
- Praetorian's Purple Team ATT&CK for testing.
 - <u>https://github.com/praetorian-code/purple-team-attack-automation</u>

Conclusion

Conclusion

- Educating more people on planning makes the world a better place.
- Plan operations meticulously because it will make your life much easier.
 - Determine potential pitfalls and avoid them where possible.
- Use the defined Strategic, Operational, and Tactical methodology.
- Stay on plan with MITRE's ATT&CK Framework.
- Work "smarter, not harder" and use tooling to automate your workflow.



Frodo Its Over Its Done Meme

Questions?

